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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of the issue of law certified by the United States
District Court for the District of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(1)(2001).
ISSUES
Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah certified the following issue of law to this Court:
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily
would be immune from suit in cases of strict liability, may
be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs
establish negligence.
(Addendum at tab 2.)
The United States submits that the issue as stated comprises two related
issues:
1.

Whether a person or entity that negligently provides alcohol to an

intoxicated person is liable to a third party who is injured by the intoxicated
person.
2.

Whether the liability created by Utah's Dramshop Act is a form of

strict liability that does not require proof of fault, wrongful intent, or negligence.

RELEVANT STATUTE
A copy of Utah's Dramshop Act in effect in 1999, when the relevant events
allegedly occurred (Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.)), is submitted at
tab 1 of the addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs John and Joan Miller sued the United States in the United States
District Court seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. Plaintiffs allege that an employee of the United
States negligently served alcohol to an intoxicated person in violation of Utah's
Dramshop Act, and that the intoxicated person caused a motor vehicle accident
that resulted in Plaintiffs' injuries.
The United States moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds
that (1) Utah law does not recognize a common-law negligence claim against a
dramshop for injuries caused by an intoxicated dramshop customer, and (2) the
United States cannot be held liable under Utah's Dramshop Act because the FTCA
exempts strict-liability claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity. After these
issues were briefed and argued, Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District
Court certified to this Court the issue of state law set forth above.
2

Factual Allegations
Since the issue certified to this Court arises in the context of a motion to
dismiss, the following is a summary of the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
(U.S. District Court record, document 1.)
Plaintiffs allege that on June 12, 1999, they were seriously injured in a
motor vehicle accident caused by Arthur Valle. (Complaint, f 10, 17-18.)
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Valle was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that
his intoxication caused him to drive at an excessive speed and collide with
Plaintiffs' vehicle. (Complaint,! 10.)
Mr. Valle was an employee of the United States Air Force. (Complaint, f
5.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Valle became intoxicated at the NCO
(noncommissioned officer) Club at Hill Air Force Base. (Complaint, f 6-7.)
Plaintiffs allege that federal employees of the NCO Club "negligently and
carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was "clearly and visibly
extremely intoxicated" and allowed Mr. Valle to leave the NCO Club and drive an
automobile while he was intoxicated. (Complaint, f 8-9.) Plaintiffs allege that
these actions by Air Force employees violated Utah's Dramshop Act. (Complaint,
19.)

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts claims for common-law negligence and for
statutory liability under Utah's Dramshop Act. The United States is not liable to
Plaintiffs under either legal theory.
Plaintiffs' claim for common-law negligence is legally deficient because
this Court has consistently held that a third party who is injured by an intoxicated
person does not have a cause of action for common-law negligence against the
person or entity that served alcohol to the intoxicated person. The injured party's
only basis for relief is Utah's Dramshop Act.
Plaintiffs cannot prevail against the United States under the Dramshop Act
because Congress has not waived the federal government's sovereign immunity
from that claim. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the government's immunity
only in cases of "the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of government
employees. This language does not include claims based on theories of strict
liability. Since this Court has consistently held that the Dramshop Act imposes a
form of strict liability, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity from
claims under Utah's Dramshop Act.

ARGUMENT
I.

Legal Framework
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of the United States'

sovereign immunity. U.S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). Under the
FTCA, the United States is liable in tort claims to the same extent that a private
person would be liable under the law of the forum state. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2674; see Avala v. United States. 49 F.3d 607, 610 (10th Cir. 1995). The FTCA's
waiver of immunity is limited, however, to injuries resulting from "the negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of a federal employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The
United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this language to mean
that Congress did not intend to waive the federal government's immunity from
claims based on theories of strict or absolute liability. Dalehite v. United States.
346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953): see also Laird v. Nelms. 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972)
(noting that the Dalehite decision was based "on the Court's determination that the
[FTCA] did not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon the
Government.").
Although Plaintiffs' Complaint is not divided into separate causes of action,
it appears to allege two claims: (1) common-law negligence (the federal
employees "negligently and carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was
5

"clearly and visibly" intoxicated),1 and (2) statutory liability under Utah's
Dramshop Act. As discussed below, the United States cannot be held liable under
either theory.
II.

Plaintiffs9 common-law negligence cause of action does not exist under
Utah law.
The Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act in 1981. Prior to the

enactment of the Dramshop Act, a person or entity that served alcohol to an
intoxicated person had no liability to a third party who was injured by the
intoxicated person.
In 1981, the Dramshop Act was enacted and created a
statutory cause of action, which did not exist at common
law, against dramshops. Our legislature, like those of other
states, passed dramshop legislation to abrogate the
common law rule precluding the liability of a party who
sells or otherwise provides alcohol to a person who is
intoxicated and injures another.
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 532 (Utah), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011
(2000). The common-law rule in Utah is consistent with the law in most
jurisdictions. IdL (citing 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 502 (1999) and
Annotation, Right of Action at Common Law for Damage Sustained by Plaintiff in

lr

The interpretation of Plaintiffs' Complaint as alleging common-law negligence is
corroborated by Plaintiffs' prayer for damages of "no less than two million dollars,"
which exceeds the maximum damages allowed by the Dramshop Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 32A-14-101(6) (1999 Repl.).
6

Consequence of Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-forming Drugs to
Another, 97 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1980)). 'The legal theory behind the general rule is
that when a third party is injured by an inebriated individual, it is the drinking of
the alcohol, not the furnishing of it, which proximately causes the injury." Id.
(citing Yost v. State. 640 P.2d 1044, 1046 n.2. (Utah 1981)).
This Court has recognized an exception to this common-law rule only in
cases where the alcohol purveyors violated the statute barring the sale of alcohol
to minors. Yost. 640 P.2d at 1046; Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130, 133
(Utah 1978). "These two cases [Yost and Rees] recognize a cause of action in
favor of a third person against a vendor of alcohol who sells the same negligently
and in violation of a statute to an underage purchaser, who becomes intoxicated
and causes injury to the third person." Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp.. 995 P.2d
1233, 1235 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). However, "neither fYost nor Rees]
established a common law cause of action in favor of third persons against
commercial vendors of alcohol where there was no statutory violation." Adkins, 1
P.3d at 532.
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that federal employees "negligently and
carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was intoxicated. This is precisely
the type of common-law claim that this Court has consistently rejected. Mr. Valle
7

was not a minor, so Plaintiffs' claim does not fall within the narrow exception
recognized in Yost and Rees. Consequently, Plaintiffs' common-law negligence
claim is deficient as a matter of law.
III.

The United States cannot be held liable under Utah's Dramshop Act
because it is a strict-liability statute.
The nature of the liability imposed by the Dramshop Act is relevant

because, as discussed above, the FTCA is a limited waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity. Congress waived the government's immunity
for injuries resulting from "the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of
government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States Supreme Court
has held that this language does not waive immunity for claims based on theories
of strict liability.
In Dalehite v. United States, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that
the federal government was subject to strict liability in connection with an
explosion that occurred during the transportation of a fertilizer compound. The
plaintiffs argued that the FTCA's imposition of liability for the "wrongful act" of a
government employee should include liability for an allegedly "extra hazardous"
activity such as the transportation of explosive fertilizer. 346 U.S. at 44-45. The
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' legal

8

theory was "well known in tort law generally" but nonetheless held that the
plaintiffs' strict-liability claim was barred because "the [FTCA] requires a
negligent act." Id.
The Supreme Court reiterated this interpretation of the FTCA in Laird v.
Nelms, where the plaintiffs sought to recover for property damage allegedly
resulting from a sonic boom caused by U.S. military aircraft. The Supreme Court
rejected this claim because it was based on a strict-liability theory arising from an
allegedly "ultrahazardous activity." 406 U.S. at 800-801. The Court relied on its
holding in Dalehite that "the Act did not authorize the imposition of strict liability
of any sort upon the Government." Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
Although the extent of the FTCA's coverage is a federal question for the
federal district court's determination, that issue depends on the type of liability
imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act. The United States submits that this requires
nothing more than a restatement of this Court's consistent interpretation of the
Dramshop Act as a strict-liability statute.
This Court first addressed this issue in 1991. "The dramshop statute
imposes strict liability, the effect of which is to make it unnecessary to allege and
prove negligence on the part of the dramshop." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111,
117 (Utah 1991), overruled on other grounds. Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 996
9

P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 2000). "[T]he clear intent of the legislature was to
compensate innocent third parties by making dramshop owners strictly liable
without regard to the finding of fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on
their part." Reeves, 813 P.2d at 116. In Red Flame, the Court partially overruled
Reeves, holding that a dramshop's liability under the Act could be apportioned
with the liability of the drunk driver. 996 P.2d at 543. Nonetheless, the Court in
Red Flame confirmed the premise of Reeves that "the Dramshop Liability Act
prescribes a form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence . . . ." Id.
In Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., this Court again evaluated the nature of the
liability imposed by the Dramshop Act and again concluded that it imposes "a
form of strict liability." 1 P.3d at 532. The Court cited with approval the
conclusion in Reeves that the legislature's purpose in enacting the Dramshop Act
was to compensate innocent third parties without requiring proof of fault or
negligence. Id (citing Reeves, 813 P.2d at 116).
This Court's construction of the Dramshop Act is consistent with the Act's
terms. As discussed above, the Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act to
provide a remedy that did not exist at common law. But the legislature did not
simply create a negligence cause of action imposing unlimited potential liability
on dramshops. Instead, the legislature placed a cap on a dramshop's potential
10

liability. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(6) (1999 RepL), and required that any
claim be brought within two years. Id, at § 32A-14-101(7) (1999 RepL). These
limitations on the injured party's claim are balanced by the relaxed burden of
proof imposed on the injured party. Rather than requiring proof of negligence, the
Act allows an injured party to recover damages from a commercial purveyor of
alcohol if the purveyor provided alcohol to a person who was "apparently under
the influence" of alcohol or who the purveyor "knew or should have known" was
under the influence of alcohol. Id at § 32A-14-101(l)(b)(ii)(B), (C) (1999 RepL).2
These provisions are consistent with the principle of strict liability.
Although strict-liability claims do not require proof of negligence, they
nonetheless arise in the context of some act or event deemed worthy of imposing
liability on the actor. Thus, for example, strict products liability is imposed
because of a defect in design or manufacture of a product, but does not require the
fact-finder to evaluate whether the defendant was negligent in the design or
manufacture. Likewise, the strict liability imposed as a result of an
"ultrahazardous" activity results from an act of the defendant - - engaging in an

2

Liability also exists in cases where alcohol was provided to a person under the
age of 21 or to a "known interdicted" person. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14101(l)(b)(ii)(A), (D) (1999 RepL).
11

inherently dangerous activity - - but does not require an examination of whether
the defendant acted with reasonable care.
Utah's Dramshop Act imposes liability in a similar fashion. A commercial
purveyor is liable upon proof that it provided alcohol to a person who was
apparently intoxicated or who the purveyor knew or should have known was
intoxicated. The Act does not, however, require an examination of whether the
purveyor was negligent. Thus, the liability imposed by the Dramshop Act is
properly construed to be "a form of strict liability." Red Flame, 996 P.2d at 543.
CONCLUSION
The United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act "to the same
extent as a private individual." The question, therefore, is the extent of liability of
a private person or entity under the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint. As
discussed above, the only liability that could arise from the facts alleged by
Plaintiffs is that imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act.
For these reasons, the United States requests that this Court answer the issue
certified by the United States District Court as follows:
I.

A person or entity that provides alcohol to an intoxicated person is

not liable to a third party injured by the intoxicated person under a claim of
common-law negligence.

12

II.

The liability imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act is a form of strict

liability that does not require proof of fault, wrongful intent, or negligence.
DATED this 6

day of June, 2003.
PAUL M. WARNER
United States Attorney

JEFFK^^^SON '
Assistant United States Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF
APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA were hand-delivered this
/1£*fr
of June, 2003, to the following:
Edward P. Moriarity
Jeffrey D. Gooch
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Copies of the following documents are attached hereto:
I.

Utah's Dramshop Act in effect at the time of the events alleged in

Plaintiffs' Complaint Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.).
II.

The Order of United States District Judge Tena Campbell certifying

this matter to this Court.
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32A-14-101

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribution of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action —
Statute of limitations — Employee protections.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (9), a person described in Subsection (l)(b) is liable for:
(i) an injury in person, property, or means of support to:
(A) any third person; or
(B) the heir, as denned in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third
person; or
(ii) for the death of a third person,
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (l)(a) if:
(i) the person directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides an alcoholic beverage:
(A) to a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(ii); and
(B) as part of the commercial sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products;
(ii) those actions cause the intoxication of:
(A) any individual under the age of 21 years;
(B) any individual who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic products or drugs;
(C) any individual whom the person furnishing the alcoholic
beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances was
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or
(D) any individual who is a known interdicted person; and
(hi) the injury or death described in Subsection (l)(a) results from
the intoxication of the individual who is provided the alcoholic
beverage.
(2) (a) A person 21 years of age or older who is described in Subsection (2)(b)
is liable for:
(i) an injury in person, property, or means of support to:
(A) any third person; or
(B) the heir, as defined in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third
person; or
(ii) for the death of the third person,
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (2)(a) if:
(i) that person directly gives or otherwise provides an alcoholic
beverage to an individual who the person knows or should have
known is under the age of 21 years;
(ii) those actions caused the intoxication of the individual provided
the alcoholic beverage;
(hi) the injury or death described in Subsection (2)(a) results from
the intoxication of the individual who is provided the alcoholic
beverage; and
(iv) the person is not liable under Subsection (1), because the
person did not directly give or provide the alcoholic beverage as part
of the commercial sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribution, or
consumption of alcoholic products.
(3) Except for a violation of Subsection (2), an employer is liable for the
actions of its employees in violation of this chapter.
846
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(4) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) or (2) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1) or (2).
(5) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(6) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after January 1,
1998, is limited to $500,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded
to all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $1,000,000.
(7) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury.
(8) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
(9) (a) An employer may not sanction or terminate the employment of an
employee of a restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise beer
retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a result
of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to
refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee considers to
meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection (1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Antidiscrimination Act.
(10) This section does not apply to a general food store or other establishment licensed under Chapter 10, Part 1, to sell beer at retail for off-premise
consumption.
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989,
ch. 240, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 23,
§ 178; 1996, ch. 240, § 38; 1997, ch. 94, § 1;
1997, ch. 375, § 28.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, in Subsection
(8Kb) substituted the citation at the end for
"Title 34, Chapter 35, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act."

The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective
July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A" for "Title
35A" in Subsection (8Kb).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 94, effective
January 1, 1998, rewrote the section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
—Third persons.
Construction.
Comparative negligence.
Military base.
Purpose.
Applicability.
When the principal provisions of the
Dramshop Act, as it existed prior to amendment by Laws 1997, ch. 94, are read in context
with the definitions provided by that Act, the
Act is not ambiguous. The statute's plain language explicitly limits liability to persons who
provide alcoholic beverages "at a location allow-

ing consumption on the premises [.]" Conspicuously absent from the definition of "premises" is
the word "house" or "private residence."
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Alcohol purchased by various people and
made available to everyone at a party was not
supplied for a commercial purpose; thus, the
Dramshop Act was inapplicable and the trial
court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of employer and one of its employees for
actions of another of its employees who was
intoxicated, in plaintiff's action for damages
based on assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the
Utah Dramshop Act. D.D.Z. ex rel. M.T.Z. v.
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- 3 JAN 03 PM 3 : 5 1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
^\
DISTRICLAF
y r A ; UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
BY:

JOHN MILLER and JOAN MILLER,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.

Case No. L02CV37TC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on its own motion, pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the certification of questions of law
by United States courts, hereby submits to the Utah Supreme Court the following certified
question of Utah law which is determinative of certain of Plaintiffs' claims in the abovecaptioned matter now pending before this court, but which does not appear to be clearly
answered under Utah statutory law and controlling precedent:
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in
cases of strict liability, may be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs
establish negligence.
Background1
On June 12, 1999, Plaintiffs John and Joan Miller ("the Millers'1) were seriously injured

1

Because this action is before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the background facts are
accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs.

in a car accident caused by Arthur Valle. Mr. Valle was intoxicated and driving at an excessive
speed when his car collided with the Millers' car.
Mr. Valle was an employee of the United States Air Force and had been drinking at the
NCO Club at Hill Air Force Base on the night of the accident. The Millers contend that the
employees of the NCO Club "negligently and carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he
was "clearly and visibly extremely intoxicated." The employees of the NCO Club then allowed
Mr. Valle to leave the NCO Club in his car.
As a result of the accident, the Millers were seriously injured, Joan Miller required
extensive medical treatment and will continue to require medical treatment in the future. She is
disabled and unable to work. John Miller suffered several injuries, including a right
pneumothorax and a fractured ankle. Mr. Miller missed work because of his injuries and the
need to assist in his wife's recuperation. The Millers have extensive medical expenses as a result
of the accident.
The Millers allege that the government is liable for damages they suffered under the
Federal Tort Claim Act ("FTCA" or "the Act") (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)), in part, for negligently
selling alcohol in violation of Utah's Dramshop Act, UTAH CODE ANN, § 32A-14a-101, et seq.
The government moves to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
Discussion
The FTCA waives the government's sovereign immunity with respect to claims based on
"the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of a government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
2

The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that this language does not waive immunity
for claims based on theories of strict liability. See Dalchite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,45-46.
(1953); see also McKay v. United States, 703 R2d 464, 472 (10,b Cir. 1983) ("Nor does the
FTCA authorize actions against the government based on strict tort liability."); Laird v. Nelms,
406 U.S. 797, 798-799 (1972) (liability cannot be imposed under the FTCA absent some
negligence or wrongful act or omission). "Accordingly, liability [under the FTCA] cannot be
imposed without a finding of the presence of negligence or some other recognized misfeasance
or nonfeasance on the part of the government." kL (citing Laird, 406 U.S. at 799). In this case,
the Millers have alleged, in part, negligent acts by employees of the Air Force, which they claim
violate Utah's Dramshop Act.
The government contends that Utah's Dramshop Act is a strict liability statute and is the
exclusive remedy for acts within its coverage. See Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 532
(Utah 2000) (stating that Utah's Dramshop Act imposes strict liability). The government argues
that because a claim of negligence against purveyors of alcohol is unavailable, the Millers cannot
avail themselves of the Dramshop Act against the government to pursue what is, essentially, a
negligence action. See Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P,2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("[Njcgligence is
preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act reaches."); Adkins. 1
P.3d at 532 (stating that Utah has never had a common law claim against one who furnishes
alcohol to a person who subsequently injures a third person due to drunkenness and that
"Dramshop acts are enacted to fill [this] void

").

The Millers, however, point to the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Smith v, Pena, 621
3

F.2d 873 (7lh Cir, 1980), a case factually similar to the one here. In Smith, the court found that if
plaintiffs could prove that under Illinois law the Army employees were negligent in serving
drinks to an intoxicated person, and thus establish the required causation, their FTCA action
could be maintained. Id, In making this determination, the court reasoned that:
Absolute liability exists under the Dram Shop Act because the niinois legislature wished
for both penal and remedial purposes to impose liability on more tavern operators, not
fewer, than if a negligence standard were used. It would be incongruous if in
circumstances where the state has cast its net wider than in a traditional negligence
action, a Government employee is automatically excused from liability even if his
negligence can be proved.
Id.
In the interest of cooperative judicial federalism, this court believes that the question of
Utah law presented in this case is best answered by the Utah Supreme Court. Sec Lehman Bros,
v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
Conclusion
This court concludes that the question outlined herein is unsettled under existing Utah
law. Accordingly, the clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this Certification to counsel for
all parties to the proceedings in this court. The clerk also shall submit to the Utah Supreme
Court a certified copy of this Certification, together with the briefs filed in this court and any
portion of the record before this court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant

4

to Rule 41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this court orders that the fees and costs
of this Certification shall be apportioned equally between the parties.
DATED this J ?

day of January, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

^^€UJ4JU
TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge
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